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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
CHARLES H. ORISON, sometimes 
known as 
CHAS. H. ORISON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
HERMAN HERBRIG, a single man; 
WILLIA~1 CHARLES HERBRIG and 
wife, MARY -R. HERB RIG: ILA R. 
WICHSTROM: FREDERICK HER-
BRIG, a single man: and LEOLA FORS- ' Case No.~ 
BERG, heirs-at-law of Millie M. Her-
brig, deceased; and all other persons un-
known claiming any right, title or inter-
est in or lien upon the real property des-
cribed in the pleadings adverse to the 
complainant's ownership or clouding his 
ti tie thereto, 
Defendants and Appellants 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for 
the County of Cache 
Honorable ~ewis Jones, District Judge 
NEWEL G. DAINES 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
CHARLES H. ORISON, sometimes 
known as 
CHAS. H. ORISON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
HERMAN HERBRIG, a single man; 
WILLIA~1 CHARLES HERBRIG and 
wife, MARY R. HERBRIG: ILA R. 
WICHSTROM: FREDERICK HER-
BRIG, a single man: and LEOLA FORS-, 
BERG, heirs-at-law of Millie M. Her-
brig, deceased; and all other persons un-
known claiming any right, title or inter-
est in or lien upon the real property des-
cribed in the- pleadings adverse to the 
complainant's ownership or clouding his 
title thereto, 
Defendants and Appellants 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 7329 
This case was decided by the trial court on conflict 
in the evidence. 
As the Appellant set forth only those facts favoring 
his position we, of necessity, must set forth the facts upon 
which the trial court ruled in favor of Respondent. 
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Millie M. Herbrig, the wife and mother of the Appel-
lants, purchased the property in question June 9, 1917, 
(Ex. "A," sheets 13-14) and owned it until ~1ay 1, 1937, 
when title passed to Cache County because of unpaid 
taxes (Exhibit ''A" Sheet 18). On May 26, 1937, Cache 
County conveyed the property to the Respondent (Exhibit 
"A/> sheet 19). On February 28 ,1951, Respondents filed 
this notice to quiet title, ( R-2) thirteen years and nine 
months after he acquired ownership. 
~1illie M. Herbrig and Herman Herbrig, her husband 
and family lived in Logan until 1922 when they moved to 
California where she died March 9, 1935. ( R. 7 4-75). 
Her mother, Annie E. Orison for several years lived with 
Mrs. Herbrig and family until her death June 16, 1936. 
( R. 45). The Respondent attended his mother> s funeral 
in California. ( R. 46). 
The Respondent, between 1910 and 1946 lived at 
Arbon, Idaho, when he 1noved to Logan. I:Iowever, begin-
ning with the fall of 1936, during the winter months he 
resided at Logan, Utah ( R. 44, 103). Arbon, Idaho, is 
100 miles from Logan Utah ( R. 102). At the time of his 
mother>s death and when he purchased the property he 
was residing in Idaho ( R. 48, 102). Millie M. Her brig 
on her death was survived by her husband Hern1an Her-
brig and the following children: Ila Wichstrom, Leola 
Forsberg, Fred 0. Her brig ( R. 73). All of them, on May 
26, 1937, the date Respondent purchased the property, 
were residents of the State of California. 
In 1942, the defendant Leola Forsberg moved to 
Logan at which time she was told by Respondent that he 
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owned the property in question having purchased it be-
cause of delinquent taxes. ( R. 42, 53, 54, 55, 92, 99). 
Herman Herbrig testified that the Respondent while 
attending his mother's funeral in California agreed with 
him to look after the property, collect the rents, pay the 
taxes and pay the mortgage indebtedness thereon which 
was $150.00 plus some interest and maintain the property 
for him and all of the children except the daughter Leola 
Forsberg. That respondent was to keep the balance of the 
rents for his trouble (Ex. 4, pages 4, 5, 6). This conversa-
tion the Respondent denied ( R. 48, 49, 50) . 
From 1927 to 1946 the property was occupied by only 
one tenant, Frederick Jufer and family ( R. 63, 111, 112). 
Appellants, Herbrig and Ila Wichstrom, testified they re-
ceived no rents after the death of Mrs. Orison in June, 
1936. That Respondent collected rents from that date on. 
( R. 84, Ex. 4, p. 8). This the respondent denied asserting 
that he did not collect the rents until after he purchased 
it on May 26, 1937. ( R. 50, 51). The tenants, Jufers, 
testified that after the death of Millie M. Herbrig they 
forwarded the rents to Appellant Herman Herbrig in Cali-
fornia, until June or July, 1937, when they started paying 
the rent to Respondent ( R. 63 64, 112, 113, 125, 127). 
The Appellants received no tax notices after the sale 
of the property to Respondents. Soon after the Respond-
ent purchased the property in June or July, 1937, he called 
on the Jufers who occupied the property as tenants, ex-
hibited to them the deed he received from the County 
conveying the property to him, advising Jufers he had 
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purchased it because of unpaid taxes and directed them 
thereafter to pay the rents to him. ( R. 50, 51, 64, 113) Mr. 
Jufer wrote to Mr. Herbrig in California telling him the 
Respondents claimed the property and that he had been 
directed to pay him the rent. Mr. Herbrig replied re-
questing more information. To this letter Mr. Jufer then 
replied advising Herbrig that the Respondent said he had 
purchased the property because of delinquent taxes. No 
reply was had to this letter. ( R. 64, 115, 116, 126, 127). 
None of the Appellants except as above mentioned 
ever communicated with the tenants regarding the pro-
perty nor did they at any time communicate with Respond-
ent regarding it, demand an accounting for the rents, 
demand the rents nor did they claim any right, title or 
ownership in the property until thirteen years and nine 
months had passed after its purchase by the Respondents, 
when this action was commenced. ( R. 65, 85, 86, 87, 89). 
The property was subject to a mortgage in the sum of 
$150.00 and interest which Respondent satisfied after he 
purchased the property. He first learned of the mortagage 
after its conveyance to him. ( R. 39, 51, 52). 
ARGUMENT 
In view of the evidence the trial court could not have 
reasonably reached any other conclusion than that which 
it did, namely, that there was never any agreement where-
in the Respondent agreed to act as the Appellant's agent, 
collecting the rents, paying the taxes and satisfying tl1c 
mortgage. All of their acts were inconsistent with such 
an understanding and the trial court very aptly stated it 
when it said: 
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"In the case of Orison vs. Herbrig findings and 
decree may be prepared in favor of plaintiff and 
against the defendants the court finding that no agree-
ment was ever entered into by the surviving husband 
and the plaintiff, the court being influenced by the 
conduct of the parties since the alleged date in that 
the defendants have not conducted themselves in a 
manner consistent with the. claim of ownership." 
(R. 108). 
The evidence is not contradicted that from the 
time Respondent purchased the property, May 26, 
1937, to the date this action was filed no inquiry was 
made by any of the appellants regarding the property 
except by Mrs. Forsberg who, in 1942, was told by 
Respondent, her uncle, that he purchased the pro-
perty, and the inquiry by Herman Herbrig in 1937 
when he worte to Mr. Jufer, the tenant, requesting 
additional information regarding Respondent's claim 
of ownership. Appellants never claimed they owned 
the property, did not visit it, make any demands on 
the tenants for the payment of the rent or communi-
cate with Respondent in any manner. Had there 
been such an arrangement or had appellants claimed 
to have owned the property during this period of 
thirteen years and nine months some inquiries and 
investigations would have been made regarding the 
property. In other words, from 1937 until this action 
to quiet title was commenced the Appellants took no 
interest, except as above mentioned, in the property 
which now has a value of approximately $2,000.00. 
The evidence established further that the Appellants 
knew that the Respondent claimed the ownership of the 
property because in 1942 he told the Defendant Leola 
Forsberg that he had purchased it and in 1937 Mr. Jufer, 
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the tenant, wrote to Mr. Herbrig that the Respondent had 
visited them, told them, he had purchased the property, 
exhibited to them a deed to it and demanded that they 
thereafter pay the rents to him which they did. 
To support their contention of such an agreement it 
was necessary for them to assert that immediately upon 
the death of Mrs. Orison on June 16, 1936 the date of the 
so-called agency agreement that the Respondent began 
to ·~look after the property and collect the rents. That 
after her death they received no rent on the property. 
This position is not in keeping with the truth. The Re-
spondent testified that he did not collect any rents until 
he purchased it in ~1ay, 1937, as did the tenants, Jufers. 
Mr. Jufer and his. daughter, Mrs. Marie Zimn1erman, testi-
fied that they forwarded the rents to California to appel-
l~nts until June or July, 1937, when Respondent called on 
them, exhibited his deed and requested payments there-
after be made to him. 
The Appellants make a great deal 9f the fact over the 
years Mrs. Orison lived with them, and that they cared for 
her, paid her funeral and burial expenses. It is not clear 
from the record just what the arrangement was between 
Mrs. Orison and the Appellants except we do know that 
she lived with. them from at least 1922 on. Apparently 
there was more than a moral obligation in taking care of 
her otherwise there would have been some demands made 
upon Respondent and his sister, Leatha McNeal, to assist 
in carrying the financial responsibilities for her support. 
( Leatha McNeal after her sister's death did go to Cali-
fornia and assist in the care of her mother.) If Respond-
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ent was delinquent in the support of his mother as they 
contend it is highly questionable that they would have 
reposed in him the responsibility of the care of the pro-
perty in Utah when all that was involved was the collection 
of rents and the payment of taxes which they could do by 
mail nor would they have reiPained silent regarding the 
property for approximately fourteen years after they had 
notice that it had been purchased by Respondent, and 
that he elaimed the ownership. Certainly, some investi-
gation would have been made by them. The care of the 
grandmother, Mrs. Orison apparently was an obligation 
of the Appell~nts, and one not expected of the Respondent 
otherwise they would have made some demand on the 
Respondent to not only assist .in her financial support but 
in taking care of her funeral and burial expenses. 
IF A TRUST EXISTED IT WAS REPUDIATED BY 
THE RESPONDENT MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS 
PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS AC-
TION. 
The evidence is undisputed that in 1942, Leola 
Forsberg, one of the defendants, an heir of Millie M. 
Herbrig, were told by the Respondent that he owned the 
property having purchased it b~cause of unpaid taxes. Mr. 
Jufer, the tenant, and his daughter, Marie Zimmerman 
testified that in 1937, Mr. Jufer wrote to Mr. Herbrig, the 
Appellant who claimed to have represented all of the 
appellants, advising him that Respondent claimed that he 
owned the property having purchased it because of de-
linquent taxes and that he had shown them a deed. 
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-As to tlie question of notice the Court in the case of 
Salt Lake City vs. Salt Lake Investment Co., 134 P. 603, 
43 Utah 181, said: 
In Shain vs. Sresovich, 104 Cal. at page 405, 38 
Pac. at page 52, the Supreme Court of California, in 
passing upon the effect of a statute of which the 
portion we have quoted above is an exact transcript, 
says: 
"The rule is well established that the means of 
knowledge is equivalent to knowledge and that a 
party who has the opportunity of knowing the facts 
constituting the fraud of which he complains cannot 
be supine and inactive, an.d afterwards allege a want 
of knowledge that arose by reason of his laches or 
negligence." 
As to the question of notice, also see the Utah case of 
Gibson vs. Jensen, 158 P. 426, 48 Utah 244; Smith vs. 
Edwards, 17 P. 2nd 264, 81 Utah 244. 
And as to when the Statute of Limitations begins to 
run in such an action, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in the 
case of Jack Waite Mining C., vs. West, 101 P. 2nd 202, 
said: 
( 1-3) We consider this last contention of de-
fendant first, for if it be correct and applicable to the 
facts, there is no need for us to go further. We think 
it is the law that where the trustee of an express trust, 
to the knowledge of his cestui que trust, repudiates 
the trust and converts the property, the statute then 
begins to run. Nor do we understand that plaintiff 
questions this. We also think the better reasoning is 
that even though plaintiff may not have notice of the 
specific repudiation of the trust, yet if he knows facts 
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from which a reasonable man would be put on notice 
that the trust has been, or is about to be, repudiated, 
this is equivalent to ach1al notice of the repudiation. 
A cestui que trust should not be permitted to shut his 
eyes and refuse to recognize a plain warning of danger 
and then claim that he had no knowledge of the catas-
trophe when it comes. Weniger vs. Success Mining 
Co., 8 cir. 22~7 F. 548. 
And to the same effect is the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana in the case of State ex rei. Central Auxiliary Corpora-
tion vs. Rorabeck, County Treasurer, of Golden Valley 
County, et al. (Phillips Inv. Co. et al., Interveners), 108 
P 2nd 601. 
The court said: 
( 5, 6) It is generally held that as between the 
trustee and the beneficiary of a trust, the status of 
limitations does not run until the trust has been re-
pudiated and notice of repudiation received by the 
beneficiary. Blackford vs. City of Libby, supra; City 
44 L. Ed 96. The rule is succintly stated in 4 Bogert 
of New Orleans vs. Warner, 175 U. S. 120, 30 S. Ct. 
on Trusts and Trustees, page 951, as follows: 
"The true _rule with respect to the statute of limi-
tations and express trusts is more clearly stated as 
follows: During performance of the express trust 
there is no cause of action for breach and so the 
statue of limitations has no bearing on the .rights of 
the cestui; but, if the trustee violates the trust and 
the cestui knows of such conduct, or could have 
learned of it by the use of reasonable diligence, the 
court will apply the statute of limitations which gov-
erns equitable causes of action or an analagous statute 
concerning legal causes of action. To cause the sta-
tute to begin running during the life of the trust there 
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must be some act of repudiation of the trust by the 
trustee, as where he declines to account to the cestui, 
takes trust income for his own purpose, or sets himseH 
up as the owner of the trust capital. 
Also see Mayse vs. Mineola Co-op Exchange, 30 
P. 2nd. 120. 
In this case Appellants had actual notice that Re-
spondent owned the property and if a trust ever existed 
it was repudiated by Respondent more than seven years 
before commencement of this action to quiet title. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we merely desire to say that the judg-
ment of the trial court was in keeping with law and equity 
and made upon a preponderance of the evidence and it 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
NEWEL G. DAINES 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
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